O UR inquiry began from the observation of a strange contrast.
1 St. Augustine restricted the image of God within us to the ratio superior. 2 St. Thomas restricted the image to the principium verbi, verbum, and amor of rational creatures.
3 But in prevalent theological opinion there is as good an analogy to the procession of the Word in human imagination as in human intellect, while the analogy to the procession of the Holy Spirit is wrapped in deepest obscurity. 4 It seemed possible to eliminate the obscurity connected with the second procession by eliminating the superficiality connected with opinions on the first. With this end in view we have devoted four articles to an exploration of related points in Thomist metaphysics and rational psychology. We now turn to the imago Dei, h which is the central issue both in Aquinas' thought on verbum and, as well, in our inquiry.
Ipsum intelligere
There are two radically opposed views of knowing. 6 For the Platonist, knowing is primarily a confrontation; it supposes the duality of knower and known; it consists in a consequent, added movement» The suppo sition of duality appears in Plato's inference that, because we know ideas, therefore ideas subsist. The conception of knowing as movement appears in Plato's dilemma that the subsistent idea of Being either must be in movement or else must be without knowing. 7 The same dilemma forced Plotinus to place the One beyond knowing; Nous could not be first, because Nous could not be simple. In St. Augustine the notion that knowing is by confrontation appears in the affirmation that we somehow see and consult the eternal reasons. In the medieval writers of the Augustinian reaction, knowing as confrontation reappears in the species impressa that is an object and in the doctrine of intuitive, intellectual cognition of material and singular existents. To cut a long story short, contemporary dogmatic realists escape the critical problem by asserting a confrontation of intellect with concrete reality.
For the Aristotelian, on the other hand, confrontation is secondary. Primarily and essentially knowing is perfection, act, identity. Sense in act is the sensible in act. Intellect in act is the intelligible in act. In this material world, of course, besides the knower in act and the known in act, there are also the knower in potency and the known in potency; and while the former are identical, still the latter are distinct. None the less, potency is not essential to knowing and therefore distinction is not essential to knowing. It follows that in immaterial substances, as one negates potency, so also one negates distinction: "In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum." 8 Plato's subsistent idea of Being had to sacrifice immobility to have knowledge; but Aristotle, because he conceived knowing as primarily not confrontation but identity in act, was able to affirm the intelli gence in act of his immovable mover.
As there are two radically opposed views of knowing, so there are two radically opposed views of intellect. All men are aware of their sensations. All educated men, at least, are aware of their thoughts and so of the division of thoughts into concepts, judgments, and in ferences. But only Aristotelians are sufficiently aware of their intellects to turn this awareness to philosophic account. Between the activities of sense and, on the other hand, the concepts, judgments, and in-ferences that constitute thought, there stands the intellect itself. Unlike the natures of material things, which can be known only by what they do, human intellect can be known by what it is. Efficiently, it is the light of intelligence within us, the drive to wonder, to reflection, to criticism, the source of all science and philosophy. Receptively, it offers the three aspects of potency, habit, and act. As potency, human intellect is the capacity to understand; it is common to all men, for even the stupidest of men at least occasionally understand. As habit, human intellect is fivefold: it is nous, grasping the point; episteme, grasping its implications; reflective sophia and phronesis, understanding what is and what is to be done, and finally, tekhne, grasping how to do it.
These habits are not the habitual possession of concepts, judgments, syllogisms. A sergeant-major with his manual-at-arms by rote knows his terms, his principles, his reasons; he expounds them with ease, with promptitude, and perhaps with pleasure; but he is exactly what is not meant by a man of developed intelligence. For intellectual habit is not possession of the book but freedom from the book. It is the birth and life in us of the light and evidence by which we operate on our own. It enables us to recast definitions, to adjust principles, to throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives according to variations of circumstance and exigencies of the occasion. As intellectual habit is freedom from the book, so its genesis is not tied to the book. In every first instance there were no books. In every second instance what is needed is not a book but a teacher, a man who understands, a man who can break down the book's explanation into still more numerous steps for the tardy and, contrariwise, for the intelligent reduce the book's excessive elaborateness to essentials.
Intellectual habits, then, are not habits of concepts, judgments, inferences; they are habits of understanding; from them with promptitude, ease, pleasure, there results intelligence in act. Finally, it is intelligence in act that is the intellect, knowable and known by what it is, and so the known sufficient ground and cause of what it does. To define, not as a parrot but intelligently, intelligence must be in act; for definition is but the expression of intelligence in act. To infer, not as a mere logical exercise but as learning, intelligence in act must be developing and expressing its development in an inference. To judge rationally and responsibly, intelligence must reach the reflective act that terminates a sweep through all relevant evidence, past as well as present, sensible as well as intellectual, to grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the judgment. 9 Against this view of intellect, there stands only its privation. Conceptualists conceive human intellect only in terms of what it does; but their neglect of what intellect is, prior to what it does, has a variety of causes. Most commonly they do not advert to the act of understanding. They take concepts for granted; they are busy working out arguments to produce certitudes; they prolong their spontaneous tendencies to extroversion into philosophy, where they concentrate on metaphysics and neglect gnoseology. Still, a conceptualist can advert to the fact of understanding, to the difference between intelligent men and stupid men, to opposed manners of systematic conception with consequent oppositions in judgments and inferences. But advertence falls short of analysis. It is one thing to be aware of one's intelligence in act; it is another to distinguish agent and possible intellect, to compare possible intellect in potency, in habit, and in act, to relate intelligence in act, on the one hand, to sensible and imagined data and, on the other hand, to concepts, judgments, and inferences. Finally, one can advert to intelligence and know how it is analysed and yet recoil from accepting the analysis. It is so much more difficult to do philosophy when one's hands are tied by an array of facts; it is so much more easy to affirm an intellectual intuition of concrete reality, and thus eliminate so many problems, when the exact nature of the intellect is shrouded in obscurity.
Such are the basic positions. The Platonist conceives knowing as primarily confrontation, but the Aristotelian conceives knowing as primarily perfection, act, identity; again, the conceptualist knows human intellect only by what it does, but the intellectualist knows and analyses not only what intelligence in act does but also what it is.
It is not too surprising that conceptualists, who do not advert to their own acts of understanding, fail to observe such advertence in Aristotle and in Aquinas. The logical consequences of such a failure have, quite fortunately for my purpose, been put down in black and white. 10 Are not Aristotle's forms just Plato's ideas, plucked from their noetic heaven, and shoved into material things? Is not Aristotle's abstraction just a psychological fabrication, invented to provide us with knowledge of the Platonic ideas thrust into material things? Let us add a third question: Does there not seem to be a Rube Goldberg love of complexity in distinguishing between agent intellect, illuminated phantasm, possible intellect, intelligible species, intellection as pro duction, inner word, and intellection as knowing, when all that results is the same spiritual look at a universal that John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham attained so much more simply and directly? I do hope that conceptualist interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas will read and study Fr. Day's book and will be roused to something better than his and their suppositions. For the intellectualist, obviously, it is impossible to confuse the Aristotelian form with the Platonic idea. Form is the ousia that is not a universal, 11 but a cause of being. 12 Ontologically it is intermediary between material multiplicity and flux and, on the other hand, that intelligible and determinate unity we call ens, unum, and quid. Form is what causes matter to be a thing. On the cognitional side, form is known in knowing the answer to the question: Why are these sensible data to be conceived as of one thing, of a man, of a house? 13 But know ing why and knowing the cause, like knowing the reason and knowing the real reason, are descriptions of the act of understanding. As then form mediates causally between matter and thing, so understanding mediates causally between sensible data and conception. By a stroke of genius Aristotle replaced mythical Platonic anamnesis by psychological fact and, to describe the psychological fact, eliminated the subsistent ideas to introduce formal causes in material things. To complete the answer to Fr. Day, one need only note that primarily intellect is understanding and that understanding of the material is universal. 14 As the Aristotelian form differs from the Platonic idea, so the Aristotelian separate substance differs from the Platonic separate idea. The separate idea is what is known by confrontation in conception. The separate substance is at once a pure form and a pure act of under standing. When we understand, we understand with respect to sensible data. But the separate substances understand, yet have no senses. As their understanding is not of this or that sensible presentation, so it is not potency but act and not by confrontation with the other but by and in identity with the self. "In his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intelligens et intellectum." Aristotle did not anticipate Hegel to posit the Absolute thinking relative thought. He extrapolated from insight into phantasm to posit pure understanding unlimited by sen sible presentation. If you object that modern interpreters translate νόησνς νοήσεως as "thinking thought," I readily grant what this implies, namely, that modern interpreters suppose Aristotle to have been a conceptualist. But also I retort that medieval translators did not write "cogitatio cogitationis" but "intelligentia intelligentiae." 16 It seems to follow that medieval translators did not regard Aristotle as a conceptualist.
Aquinas accepted and developed Aristotle. He took over the dis tinction between agent and possible intellect, the latterà dependence on phantasm, the account of its potency, habits, and acts, and the distinction between the two operations of intellect. From Augustinian speculation on the procession of the inner word, he was led to distinguish far more sharply than Aristotle did between intelligence in act and its products of definition and judgment. But his greater debt was to Augustinian theory of judgment with its appeal to the eternal reasons; Aquinas transposed this appeal into his own "participate creata lucis increatae" to secure for the Aristotelian theory of knowing by identity the possibility of self-transcendence in finite intellect. 16 On his own, Aquinas identified intelligible species with intellectual habit to relate species to intelligere as form to esse, 17 a parallel that supposes a grasp of the real distinction between finite essence and existence. Aristotle had only one kind of separate substance, Aquinas worked out distinct theories of God as ipsum intelligere and of angels in whom essence, existence, intellect, and intelligere are really distinct.
19 From the Sentences he appreciated the advantage of knowing as identity in reconciling divine simplicity with divine knowledge. 20 From the Sentences he appreciated the problem that knowing as identity creates for knowledge of the other. 21 Still, there is to be discerned an increasing Aristotelianism. In the De Ventate the appeal is to immateriality as principle of both knowing and being known; 22 in the Contra Gentiles immateriality is one argument out of many, 23 with Aristotelian considerations abundant; 24 in the Summa Theologica this exuberance is pruned. Sense differs from the sensible, intellect differs from the intelligible, only inasmuch as they are in potency. But in God there is no potency. Hence in God substance, r essence, esse, intellect, species, intelligere are all one and the same. 25 Indeed, in divine self-knowledge it is impossible to say that knowing an$ known are similar, for similarity supposes duality and, until one reaches trinitarian doctrine, one knows nothing of more than one in God. 26 When Aquinas spoke of God as ipsum intelligere, did he mean that God was a pure act of understanding? To that conclusion we have been working through four articles. But to cap that cumulative argument, there comes the impossibility of Aquinas having meant anything else. Either ipsum intelligere is analogous to sensation, or it is analogous to understanding, or it is analogous to conception, or it is analogous to nothing that we know. No one will affirm that ipsum intelligere is analogous to sensation. But it cannot be analogous to conception; for it is the dicens, dicere, verbum of trinitarian theory that is analogous to conception; and ipsum intelligere is demonstrable by the natural light of reason, while trinitarian doctrine is not. Further, in trinitarian theory intelligere is essential act common to Father, Son, and Spirit, while dicere is notional act and proper to the Father. Finally, there is a divine knowing prior in the order of our conception to the divine utterance of verbum: "Ipse autem conceptus cordis de ratione sua habet quod ab alio procedat, scilicet, a notitia concipientis"; 27 and that prior knowing, that prior notitia, cannot be conceptual; it cannot be conceptual in potency, for in God there is no potency; it cannot be conceptual in habit, for in God there is no habit; it cannot be conceptual in act, for then conception in act would be prior to itself. But if ipsum intelligere is analogous neither to sensation nor to conception, it is not a solution to say that it is analogous to nothing that we know; for what is unknown cannot be meant or even named. 28 It remains that ipsum intelligere is analogous to understanding, that God is an infinite and substantial act of understanding, that as the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, so also each is one and the same infinite and substantial act of understanding, finally that, though each is the pure act of understanding, still only the Father understands as uttering the Word.
THE NECESSITY OF Verbum
We ¿egan our inquiry by listing seven elements in the Thomist concept of an inner word. 30 Six of these have been elucidated sufficiently. It remains that the necessity of the inner word be treated.
A few elementary points may be mentioned briefly. We are not concerned with the concept of verbum in the Commentary on the Sentences, in which Thomist thought on this issue had not yet matured. 81 We are ™Ibid., q. 34, a. 1 c. 28 Ibid,, q. 13, a. 1 c: Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominan. It may be said that the prior notitia is analogous to consciousness. But consciousness is either concomitant, reflective, or rational. Concomitant consciousness is awareness of one's act and oneself in knowing something else; this has no place in God who knows first Himself and then other things. Reflective consciousness supposes concomitant consciousness. Rational consciousness pertains to the intelligible procession of inner words, to the fact that they proceed from sufficient grounds because they are known to be sufficient. 29 We are not concerned with the necessity of the occurrence of verbum in our minds. That is perfectly simple: Once one understands, the proportionate cause for the inner word exists; once the proportionate cause exists, the effect follows, unless some impediment intervenes; but no impediment can intervene between understanding and its inner word. 33 Hence, granted we understand, it necessarily follows that we utter an inner word. We are not concerned with the necessity quoad se of the Word in God; whatever is in God is necessary. But we are concerned with the essential necessity of the inner word in us; why is our knowledge such that inner words are necessary in it? Next, we are concerned with the necessity quoad nos of an inner word in divine self-knowledge and in divine knowledge of the other. Why cannot we establish by the light of natural reason that there is a Word in God? Even if Aristotle's theorem that knowing is by identity excludes our demonstrating the existence of the Word from divine self-knowledge, still why cannot we demonstrate it from divine knowledge of the other?
The essential necessity of inner words in us appears as soon as Aquinas got beyond the initial period of the Sentences. In the De Veritate the Aristotelian parallel between nature and art was given its complement by a parallel between speculative and practical intellect. Practical intellect thinks out plans, designs, program^. Such plans, say, of an architect, are the form whence external oper4tion proceeds. But they cannot be the form whence proceeds the "thinking out" that evolves the plans. There must be a prior form, tfie intellectual habit of art, that stands to the thinking as the thought-out plan stands to the external operation. But if nature and art are parallel, so that nature is but God's artistry, it follows that there will be a parallel between speculative knowledge of nature and practical knowledge of art. Just as the habit of art results in the thinking out of plans whence 82 De Ver., q. 4, a. 2 c. 83 The will can prevent the occurrence of intelligere by preventing the occurrence of a corresponding phantasm. Again, the will is the cause of an act of belief, but though the latter is a verbum, it is not a verbum proceeding directly from an intelligere. But we cannot permit the occurrence of intelligere and yet prevent the procession of its immediate verbum.
artefacts are produced, so speculative habit or form, by which we under stand in act, results in the quidditas formata and the compositio vel divisto by which we come to knowledge of external things. 34 Needless to say, this intermediate role of the inner word between our under standing and the external thing does not disappear in later Thomist thought. 35 Hence, to ask about the essential necessity of inner words in us, is to ask about the essential necessity of our complementing acts of under standing with inner words to obtain knowledge of external things. The answer will be had by comparing the object of understanding with the external things. Now the first and proper object of understanding, the "what is known inasmuch as one understands/ ' must be simply in telligible; accordingly, the proportionate object of our intellects is the quidditas rei materialise This quiddity prescinds from individual matter, for individual matter is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the per se universality of forms which it individuates. Again the quiddity prescinds from contingent existence, for contingent ex istence is not intelligible in itself but only in its relation to the necessar ily Existent which is final, exemplary, and efficient cause of contingent beings. The essential necessity of inner words in our intellects is the necessity of effecting the transition from the pre-conceptual quidditas rei materialise first, to the res, secondly, to the res particularis, thirdly to the res particularis existens. The transition from quidditas rei to res, say, from humanitas to homo, occurs in conception in which there emer ges intellect's natural knowledge of ensP In virtue of this step under standing moves from identity with its pre-conceptual object to con frontation with its conceived object; but as yet the object is only object of thought. 38 The second step is a reflection on phantasm that enables one to mean, though not understand nor explanatorily define the material singular. 39 In this step intellect moves from a universal to a particular object of thought. Finally, by a reflective act of understand ing that sweeps through all relevant data, sensible and intelligible, present and remembered, and grasps understanding's proportion to 34 De Ver., q. 3, a. 2 c. 35 Ibid., q. 4, a. 2 ad 3m; De Pot., q. 8, a. 1 c; Sum. Theol., q. 34, a. 1 ad 3m ad fin.; Quodl., V, a. 9 ad lm; In loan., c. 1, lect. 1.
^THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, X (1949), 18-28. 37 Ibid., VIII (1947), 70 ff. 38 Ibid., Χ (1949), 15 f. 39 Ibid., 29 ff.
the universe as well, 40 there is uttered the existential judgment through which one knows concrete reality.
We turn to our second question. Why cannot natural reason demonstrate the existence of the divine Word from the premise of divine self-knowledge? First, the demonstration cannot be effected by contrasting the proper object of understanding with the divine essence. God is simply intelligible. He is pure form identical with existence. There is no distinction between His essence or His existence or His intellect or His understanding. 41 There is not even a distinction between His esse naturale and His esse intelligibile® Secondly, the demonstration cannot be effected by arguing that without an inner word there would be no confrontation between subject and object. For one cannot demonstrate that such confrontation is essential to knowledge. Primarily and essentially, knowing is by identity. The natural light of reason will never get beyond that identity in demonstrating the nature of self-knowledge in the infinite simplicity of God.
We turn to the third question. If divine self-knowledge has no need of an inner word, as far as natural theology goes, becahse the knowing is pure understanding and the known is simply intelligible and knowledge is by identity, still divine knowledge of the other seems to require an inner word. For the other is not simply intelligible, nor always in act, nor identical with the knower. Further, in confirmation of this argument, there is the fact that Aquinas wrote some of his finest passages on verbum in the context of divine knowledge of the other. 42a In additional confirmation there is the familiar doctrine that secondary elements in the beatific vision are known in Verbo.
Let us begin by considering the confirming arguments. The connection between the divine Word and the divine Ideas pertains to the whole· Christian Platonist tradition, 43 and can be traced back to Philo's conception of the Logos as containing the ideas. 44 It follows that one cannot say that Aquinas by an intrinsic exigence of his own thought was led to treat verbum in the context of the divine ideas. 40 Ibid., VIII (1947) There may exist such an exigence or there may exist no more than a traditional association. On the latter alternative the confirming arguments do not confirm, and we may expect the latter alternative to be the correct one. The Platonist assumption that knowledge involves confrontation led later Scholastics to attribute to the ideas an esse objectivum. Ab Certainly Aquinas was free from that error and so he can be expected to apply the Aristotelian theorem of knowledge by identity to reconcile divine simplicity with divine knowledge of the other.
To handle the issue as expeditiously as possible, 46 let us proceed in two steps : first, we draw distinctions with respect to our knowledge ; secondly, we proceed from the finite model to God. With regard to our knowledge distinguish (1) the thing with its virtualities, (2) the act of understanding with its primary and its secondary objects, (3) the expression of both primary and secondary objects in inner words. For example, the human soul formally is an intellective soul, subsistent, immortal; it is not formally a sensitive soul nor a vegetative soul; but virtually it does possess the perfection without the imperfection of sensitive and vegetative souls. When, however, we understand the human soul, we understand as primary object an intellective soul and as secondary object the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul; both objects are understood formally and actually, but the secondary object is understood in the primary and in virtue of understanding the primary. Further, once understanding of the human soul has developed, there are not two acts of understanding but one, which primarily is of intellective soul and secondarily, in the perfection of intellective soul, is of the sensitive and vegetative souls. Finally, our one act of understanding expresses itself in many inner words in which are defined intellective, sensitive, and vegetative souls and the relations between them; further, these inner words are the esse intelligibile or the esse inteniionale of soul as distinct both from the esse naturale of soul itself and from the esse intellectum which is an extrinsic denomination from an intelligefe of soul whether real or intentional. Now on Thomist analysis the divine essence formally is itself but eminently it contains all perfection. The divine act of understanding primarily is of the divine essence but secondarily of its virtualities. 47 The divine Word that is uttered is one, but what is uttered in the one Word is all that God knows. 48 Moreover, the divine essence, the divine act of understanding, and the divine Word considered absolutely are one and the same reality; hence there can be no real distinction between "contained eminently in the essence" and "secondary object of the understanding" or between either of these and "uttered in the one Word." Further, utterance in the one Word does not confer on the ideas an esse intelligibile that otherwise they would not possess; for in God esse naturale and esse intelligibile are identical. 49 It remains, then, that divine knowledge of the other provides no premise whence the procession of the divine Word could be established by natural reason. The plurality of divine ideas within divine simplicity is accounted for by an infinite act of understanding grasping as secondary objects the perfections eminently contained in the divine essence and virtually in divine omnipotence. 50 As we can understand multa per unum,? 1 all the more so can God.
Hence, though our intelligere is always a dicere, this cannot be demonstrated of God's.
62 Though we can demonstrate that God understands, for understanding is pure perfection, still we can no more than conjecture the mode of divine understanding and so cannot prove that there is a divine Word. 53 Psychological trinitarian theory is not a conclusion that can be demonstrated but an hypothesis that squares with divine revelation without excluding the possibility of alternative hypotheses. 54 Finally, Aquinas regularly writes as a theologian and not as a philosopher; hence regularly he simply states what simply is true, that in all intellects there is a procession of inner word. 55 
Eo M agis Unum
Scotus seems to have had no qualms in referring to the divine processions as productions. 66 Aquinas is much more restrained. In the Summa one will find dicere and notionaliter diligere defined in terms of causality; 57 one will find incidental statements in which a person that proceeds is said to be produced; 58 but it seems clear that the movement of Thomist thought is definitely away from conceiving the divine pro cessions as productions. 59 Thus, the errors of Arms and Sabellius are reduced to the mistake of conceiving the divine processions in terms of agent and effect; 60 and the Aristotelian efficient cause, "principium agendi in aliud," is regarded as relevant, not to the divine processions, but only to the production of creatures. 61 But this is puzzling. Is it true or is it false that dicere is producere verbum? Or is it true in us but not in God?
In that case what is the divine procession? We attempt an answer in three steps which, because of previous discussion, 62 may be brief.
Aristotle conceived the efficient cause as "principium motus vel mutationis in alio vel qua aliud." He conceived nature as "principium motus in eo in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens." Plainly, efficient cause and nature are complementary and opposed. An efficient cause cannot be nature; nature cannot be an efficient cause; for inasmuch as movement proceeds per se from a principle in the subject in which the movement occurs, the principle is nature; but inasmuch as movement proceeds from a principle in another subject, the principle is an efficient cause; and inasmuch as movement proceeds per accidens from a principle in the subject in which the movement occurs, the principle again is an efficient cause. Now, these definitions are not ultimately satisfactory;
63 it remains that they are Aristotle's defini tions; and they fully explain Aquinas' refusal to conceive the divine processions as instances of efficient causality. The proceeding Word and the proceeding Love are not from a principle outside God; nor are they per accidens from a principle within God; therefore, they are not from an efficient cause as conceived by Aristotle.
Secondly, Aquinas developed a more general notion of efficient causality than that defined by Aristotle. Thus, principium operati, principium effectus, processio operati include the idea of production but do not include the Aristotelian restrictions of in alio vel qua aliud. The act of understanding is to the possible intellect, the act of loving is to the will, as act to potency, as perfection to its perfectible; the procession is processio operationis and cannot be analogous to any real procession in God. But the inner word is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the procession is processio operati) in us dicere is producere verbum, even though it is natural and not an instance of Aristotelian efficient causality. Inasmuch as dicere does not involve the imperfection of processio operationis it offers an analogy to the divine procession. 64 Thirdly, is the divine dicere a producere verbum? Is there truly in God a processio operati? Evidently there is an enormous difference between the procession of an inner word in us and the procession of the Word in God. In us there are two acts, first, an act of understanding, secondly, a really distinct act of defining or judging. In God there is but one act. But not only did Aquinas advert to this rather obvious fact but also he assigned the reason for the difference : " id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit." 65 One is apt to object that as the principle and term of a procession approach identity, the procession itself approaches nothingness. But this is simply to disregard what Aquinas most emphatically asserts. The analogy to the divine processions is found only in rational creatures. Not any procession ad intra but only intelligible procession is given the property of "quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procedit." 66 In the Contra Gentiles Aquinas considered in turn minerals, plants, animals, men, angels, and God to show that in perfect intellectual reflection principle and term are identical without an elimination of the reflection and so without an elimination of the procession. 67 In the Obviously Aquinas thought he was making a point. What is it? There are two aspects to the procession of an inner word in us. There is the productive aspect; intelligence in act is proportionate to producing the inner word. There is also the intelligible aspect: inner words do not proceed with mere natural spontaneity as any effect does from any cause; they proceed with reflective rationality; they proceed not merely from a sufficient cause but from sufficient grounds known to be sufficient and because they are known to be sufficient. I can imagine a circle and I can define a circle. In both cases there is efficient causality. But in the second case there is something more. I define the circle because I grasp in imagined data that, if the radii are equal, then the plane curve must be uniformly round. The inner word of defining not only is caused by but also is because of the act of understanding. In the former aspect the procession is processio operati. In the latter aspect the procession is processio intelligibilis. Similarly, in us the act of judgment is caused by a reflective act of understanding, and so it is processio operati. But that is not all. The procession of judgment cannot be equated with procession from electromotive force or chemical action or biological process or even sensitive act. Judgment is judgment only if it proceeds from intellectual grasp of sufficient evidence as sufficient. Its procession also is processio intelligibilis.
What, then, does Aquinas mean when he writes: "id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo, quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo a quo procediti 74 He does not mean that there can be production, properly speaking, when principle and product are absolutely identical. He does mean that there can be processio intelligibilis without absolute diversity, indeed that the more perfect the processio intelligibilis is, the greater the approach to identity. In us inner word proceeds from act of understanding by a processio intelligibilis that also is a processio operati, for our inner 68 Sum . TheoL, I, q. 27, a. 1 word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really distinct. In God inner word proceeds from act of understanding as uttering by a processio intelligibilis that is not a processio operati, at least inasmuch as divine understanding and divine Word are not two absolute entities really distinct. It may be doubted that a pure processio intelligibilis is a real procession. If A is because of Β without being caused by B, the dependence of A on Β seems to be merely mental. It is true that a processio intelli gibilis cannot be real except in a mind. On the other hand, in a mind it necessarily is real; just as the mind itself and its operation are real, so the intelligible procession within the mind and the consequent relations of origin are all real. "Mental" is opposed to "real" only inasmuch as one prescinds from the reality of mind.
Indeed, the divine procession of the Word is not only real but also a natural generation. 75 In us that does not hold. Our intellects are not our substance; our acts of understanding are not our existence; and so our definitions and affirmations are not the essence and existence of our children. Our inner words are just thoughts, just esse intentionale of what we define and affirm, just intentio intellecta and not res intellecta.
76
But in God intellect is substance and act of understanding is act of existence; it follows that the Word that proceeds in Him is of the same nature and substance as its principle, 77 that His thought of Himself is Himself, that His intentio intellecta of Himself is also the res intel· leda.™ As there is an analogy of ens and esse y so also there is an analogy of the intelligibly proceeding est. In us est is just a thought, a judgment. divine Word is because of the divine understanding as uttering, yet "eo magis unum, quo perfectius procedit."
Amor Procedens
As complete understanding not only grasps essence and in essence all properties but also affirms existence and value, so also from understanding's self-expression in judgment of value there is an intelligible procession of love in the will. Evidently so, for without an intelligible procession of love in the will from the word of intellect, it would be impossible to define the will as rational appetite. Natural appetite is blind; sensitive appetite is spontaneous; but rational appetite can be moved only by the good that reason pronounces to be good. Because of the necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, sin is not act in the will but failure to act; it is failure to will to do the good that is commanded, or it is failure to will to inhibit tendencies that are judged to be wrong. Because of the same necessity of intelligible procession from intellect to will, the sinner is driven by a fine disquiet either to seek true peace of soul in repentance or else to obtain a simulated peace in the rationalization that corrupts reason by making the false appear true that wrong may appear right. Finally, however much it may be disputed whether there is any processio operati from the word of our intellects to the act in our wills, it cannot be denied that there is a processio intelligibilis from the word of intellect to the act of rational appetite.
82
Let us now see how Aquinas accounted for the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the Contra Gentiles IV, 19, he inquired: "Quomodo intelligenda sunt quae de Spiritu sancto dicuntur?" In the first paragraph he stated his intention. In paragraphs two, three, and four, he examined the nature of love. In the remaining paragraphs, five to twelve, he applied his analysis to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The three steps in his examination of love are as follows: first, he argued that in everyone who understands there must also be a will; secondly, he showed that the basic act, to which all other acts of will are to be reduced, is love; thirdly, he pointed out the difference between the presence of the beloved in the intellect and his presence in the will of the lover; in the intellect he is present "per similitudinem speciei"; in the will he is present dynamically, as the term of a movement in the movement's proportionate principle.
But what is this dynamic presence? How is the term of a movement in the movement's motive principle? Obviously, by final causality: the end determines the agent. Hence, "sicut autem influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appetì et desiderari." 83 From the term of movement there results by final causality an appetì of the term; but the appetì of the term is not in the term but in the motive principle. Similarly, by final causality there results from the beloved the amari of the beloved; and this amari of the beloved is not in the beloved but in the lover. Next, the appetì of the term in the motive principle is one and the same act as the appetere of the motive principle for the term; similarly, the amari of the beloved in the lover is one and the same act as the amare of the lover for the beloved. Hence "est autem amatum in amante secundum quod amatur"; 84 "id quod amatur est in amante secundum quod actu amatur"; 85 "amor dicitur transformare amantem in amatum, inquantum per amorem movetur amans ad ipsam rem amatam." 86 Finally, if the presence of the beloved in the lover is exactly the same entity as the act of love in the lover, why does Aquinas bother about it? Obviously because he wishes to determine the nature of love and so to show that, while the procession of the Word is a generation, still the procession of Love is not. The object of intellect is in intellect "per similitudinem speciei," but the object of will or love is in the will not by reproduction but as a goal is in tendency to the goal. 87 Paragraphs five to twelve of Contra Gentiles IV, 19, apply the foregoing analysis. First, it is shown that since God understands, He must have a will; further, this will cannot be distinct really from either the divine substance or the divine intellect. Secondly, the will of God cannot be mere potency or mere habit ; it must be in act ; and since the basic act of will is love, it must be actually loving. Thirdly, the proper object of divine love is the divine goodness which is identical with God; but love is dynamic presence ; therefore the love of God for God involves the dynamic presence of God in God. Moreover, since divine loving, divine willing, divine being are identical, it follows that the dynamic presence of God in God is not mere dynamic presence but God. Just as God's thought of God is not mere thought but God, so God's love of God is not mere accidental act but God. Fourthly, the origin of divine love is treated. There cannot be the dynamic presence of the beloved in the lover's will, unless there first is intellectual conception. Further, it is not the concept but the conceived that is loved; hence, divine love necessarily is related both to the Word and to God from whom the Word proceeds. The remaining four paragraphs explain why the procession of love is not a generation, why the Holy Spirit is named Spirit, and why he is named Holy. As was anticipated, once one grasps the processio inteïligïbilis of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear, straightforward acount Aquinas offered of proceeding love. Difficulty arises in interpreting Aquinas on this issue from purely subjective sources. A conceptualist is not interested enough in human intellect, to know what processio intelligibilis means; and so he is led to take advantage of the complexity of Thomist thought and terminology to invent pseudo-metaphysical theories about operatio and operatum.** After applying these theories to the procession of the inner word, he tries to apply them to the procession of love; and in this he is greatly encouraged by the postThomas Augustinian reaction which transformed Augustine's selfmovement of soul into self-moving potencies and, above all, denied any influence from the intellect on the will in an alleged defence of the will's liberty. What Aquinas held is quite clear. In us there is a procession of love from the will, but that is processio operationis and irrelevant to trinitarian theory. 90 In us there is a procession of one act of love from another, but that also is irrelevant to trinitarian theory. 91 In us there is a procession of love from the inner word and, as Aquinas very frequently repeated, that is the procession that is relevant to trinitarian theory. 92 In this position Aquinas was following St. Anselm. 93 He was followed by Godfrey of Fontaines, 94 and John of Naples. 95 The extent to which the notion was current merits special investigation but an indication of its currency may be had from a text published by Fr. Balie. In his Opus Oxoniense Scotus conceived the procession of the Holy Spirit as procession of love from the will. 96 In the text Fr. Balie has published, Scotus got around to applying his doctrine of partial, concurrent, coordinate causes to the will. The act of will is caused partially by the will and partially by the object presented by the intellect; in confirmation the intention of Augustine is adduced that amor procedit a mente and this is followed up by the contention that if the object is only sine quo non to the act of love, then the Word is only sine quo non to the procession of the Holy Spirit. 
Via Doctrinae
In his monumental work on medieval trinitarian thought, 98 Dr. Michael Schmaus followed the current division and devoted first over three hundred pages to "die Trinität in fieri," and then almost two hundred to "die Trinität in esse." 99 But though Aquinas in his earlier works began from God the Father to treat next the generation of the Son and then the procession of the Holy Spirit, his Summa Theologica eliminated even the semblance of a logical fiction of a becoming in God. The Summa treated first God as one, 100 to turn to God as triune "secundum viam doctrinae." 101 In this presentation the starting-point is not God the Father but God; the first question is not whether there is a procession from God the Father but whether there is a procession in God. After establishing two processions in God, the existence of real relations in God is treated. Only after both processions and relations have been treated, is the question of persons raised. 102 The significance of this procedure is that it places Thomist trinitarian theory in a class by itself.
First of all, it eliminates what Dr. Schmaus considers the crux trinitatis. 10Z Either the Father is Father by a relation or for some other reason; but neither alternative is possible. If the Father is Father by a relation, then that relation supposes a procession, so that the Father has to generate before being constituted as Father. On the other hand, if the Father is Father not by a relation, then he must be Father either by something absolute or by a negation. Neither will do.
The Thomist solution to this problem cannot be appreciated unless one grasps the Summa y s structure, which implies a twofold ordering of our trinitarian concepts. There is the order of our concepts in fieri, and then processions precede relations and relations precede persons. There is the order of our concepts in facto esse and then there are the persons as persons, 104 other hand, the notional acts are acts of the persons and consequent to the persons conceived as constituted. Once one recognizes this twofold systematization of our concepts, it becomes apparent that Aquinas' solution to the crux trinitatis is really satisfying. He maintained a distinction between the property of the Father as relation and the same property as constitutive of the Father. As relation, the property is subsequent to generation; as constitutive, the same property is prior to generation. 109 But how can the same property be both prior and subsequent? The question is not about the property itself but about the systematic order of our concepts; 110 and when there are two systematic and inverse orders, necessarily what is prior in one order will be subsequent in the other.
Secondly, the procedure of the Summa reveals very clearly the exact point of application and the measure of significance of the psychological imago Dei in trinitarian thought. It reveals the exact point of application. We desire to know quid sit Deus, but in this life the only understanding we can attain is through analogy. Philosophy proceeds from pure perfections by the ways of affirmation, negation, and eminence. Faith adds further data. Theology employs the Augustinian psychological analogy, just as philosophy employed the naturally known pure perfections. By natural reason we know that God is absolute being, absolute understanding, absolute truth, absolute love. But natural reason cannot establish that there are in God processiones intelligibiles, that the divine Word is because of divine understanding as uttering, that divine Love as proceeding is because of divine goodness and understanding and Word as spirating. Such further analogical knowledge of quid sit Deus pertains to the limited but most fruitful understanding that can be attained when reason operates in the light of faith.
111 Thus, the Augustinian psychological analogy makes trinitarian theology a prolongation of natural theology, a deeper insight into what God is.
But the procedure of the Summa also reveals the measure of signi- 109 Ibid., q. 40, a. 4 c. Materially the same distinction occurs in De Pot., q. 8, a. 3 ad 7m; q. 10, a. 3; but there it lacks an ultimate basis. 110 The question is:Videtur quod actus notionales praeintelligantur proprietatibus. In God and quoad se there is "ordo secundum originem absque prioritate" (ibid., q. 42, a. 3 c; cf. ad 2m).
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ficance to be attached to the imago Dei. As we have seen, there is a twofold systematization; first, our concepts are infierì; secondly, their order is reversed and they stand in facto esse. Now these two orders stand on different levels of thought. As long as our concepts are in development, the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery. In other words, the psychological analogy truly gives a deeper insight into what God is. Still, that insight stands upon analogy; it does not penetrate to the very core, the essence of God, in which alone trinitarian doctrine can be contemplated in its full intelligibility; grasping properly quid sit Deus is the beatific vision. 112 Just as an experimental physicist may not grasp most of quantum mathematics, but under the direction of a mathematician may very intelligently devise and perform experiments that advance the quantum theory, so also the theologian with no proper grasp of quid sit Deus but under the direction of divine revelation really operates in virtue of and towards an understanding that he personally in this life cannot possess. 113 Hence it is that the psychological analogy enables one to argue that there are two and only two processions in God, that the first is "per modum intelligibilis actionis" and a natural generation; that the second is "per modum amoris" and not a generation; that there are four real relations in God and three of them really distinct;
114 that the names verbum and imago are proper to the Son, while the names amor and donum are proper to the Holy Spirit.
116 But do not think that Aquinas allows the psychological analogy to take the place of the divine essence 112 Sum. Theol., I, q. 12, a. 1 c; I-Η, q. 3, a. 8 c. ™Sum. Theol, I, qq. 27, 28. 115 Ibid., q. 34, a. 2; q. 35, a. 2; q. 37, a. 1; q. 38, a. 2. The difference between essential love and notional love is quite plainly the difference between love considered in its essence (the dynamic presence of the beloved) and love referred to its origin, its principle. The former relates lover to beloved; the latter proceeds. The same distinction might be put by comparing love to finis operationis and finis intentionis (De Pot., q. 3, a. 16 a) . God's love of God as finis operationis is identical with God, and so essential. God's love of God as finis intentionis is God as proceeding from God as Judge and Word, and so notional.
as the one sufficient principle of explanation. The psychological analogy is just the side-door through which we enter for an imperfect look.
Thus, though the generation of the Son is "per modum intelligibilis actionis," though a proper name of the Son is the Word, still Aquinas did not conclude that the principle by which the Father generates is the divine intellect or the divine understanding. In us the inner word proceeds from understanding, and our understanding is really distinct from our substance, our being, our thought, our willing. But in God substance, being, understanding, thought, willing are absolutely one and the same reality. Accordingly, Aquinas not merely in his Commentary on the Sentences y m but also in his Summa makes the divine essence the principle of divine generation. "Sicut Deus potest generare Filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia generandi."
117 "Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in quo generatum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur Patri gignenti in natura divina. Unde natura divina in Pâtre est potentia generandi in ipso." 118 "... Id quo Pater generat est natura divina."
119
The one divine essence is common to Father and to Son. As the Father's, the essence is the potency by which the Father generates; as the Son's, the essence is the potency by which the Son is generated.
120
The potentia spirandi is conceived in parallel fashion. Father and Son are one principle because they are one God. 121 They are "duo spirantes" but "unus spirator."
122 As the potentia generandi means the divine essence but connotes a personal property, 123 so also does the virtus spirativa} u The procession of love is not voluntary but natural, even though it is "per modum voluntatis." 125 The same argument in the same passage establishes the existence of both potentia generandi and potentia spirandi.
m If one disregards the title of the next article, the contribution of a rubricist, and attends to Aquinas' own question, then its issue is: "Videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem et non essentiam."
127 It seems to follow that the divine 116 In I Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1 sol., and ad 4m; ibid., q. 1, aa. 1-3; ibid., ά. 128 This is all very far from the type of trinitarian theory in which the Word is generated by the divine intellect and proceeding Love is spirated by the divine will 129 Finally, as the reader may have gathered already, the via doctrinae of the Summa is a masterpiece of theology as science and the apex of trinitarian speculation. But I would not be misunderstood. Coherently enough on their position, conceptualists conceive science simply in terms of certitude. For them the scientific ideal is the certitude one has of the particular and contingent fact of one's own existence. For them the substance of theology is what they are certain about, while the separable accidents are what they consider probable. They cannot be expected to think much of Thomist trinitarian theory which, on its own showing, is no more than an hypothesis which does not attempt to exclude the possibility of alternatives. 130 Still, without in any way deprecating certitude or even solidity, one may point out that the cult of certitude, the search for rigorous demonstration unaccompanied by a still greater effort to understand, has been tried and has been found wanting. It is the secret of fourteenth-century scepticism. Moreover, the same result follows from the same cause at any time; for one can be certain only because one understands, or else because one believes 128 Cf. q. 36, a. 4 ad lm; q. 41, a. 5. As the Son understands essentially "non utproducens verbum sed ut Verbum procedens" (q. 34, a. 2 ad 4m), so the Holy Spirit loves essentially "ut Amor procedens, non ut a quo procedit amor" (q. 37, a. 1 ad 4m). Hence as the divine essence is the Son's potency ut generetur (q. 41, a. 6 ad lm), so also the divine essence is the Holy Spirit's potency ut spiretur.
129 Dr. Schmaus made the supposition that the criterion of Augustinian psychological theory lay in taking the divine intellect as the principle of divine generation, the divine will as the principle of divine spiration. In consequence he records his mounting surprise at the views of post-Thomas Dominicans (cf. Der Liber Propugnatorius, etc., pp. 125-34). Note especially the following from James of Metz: "Sic ergo principium, quo procedit Filius a Patre in divinis, non est intellectus, sed natura et similiter principium quo procedit Spiritus sanctus ab utroque est natura non voluntas et hoc dixit (nach Clm. 14 383 steht hier frater) Thomas Parisius in scholis publice, quod non intelligebat Filium procedere a Patre per actum intellectus sicut audivit magister Albertus (Clm. 14 383: tambertus) ab eo" (ibid., pp. 127 f. in note 48). Without insisting on James's accuracy, one cannot well refuse all significance to his testimony.
m Sum. Theol., I, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2m.
someone else who certainly understands. It is only inasmuch as different concepts proceed from one act of understanding that different concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus. Remove the effort to understand and understanding will decrease; as understanding decreases, fewer concepts are seen to be joined by a necessary nexus; and as this seeing decreases, certitudes decrease. To stop the process, either one must restore the effort to understand or one must appeal not to intellect but to some higher or lower power. Moreover, the conceptualist ideal of science is not the only ideal. For Aristotle perfect science is certain; but all science is knowledge through causes, and knowledge through causes is understanding and so of the universal and necessary. Because the conceptualist accepts only one element of the Aristotelian ideal, while modern science realizes the other element, a quite unnecessary abyss has been dug by conceptualists between the Scholasticism they claim to represent and, on the other hand, the contemporary ideal of science. Further, the conceptualist ideal of science has no exclusive claim to represent the ideal of theology as science. St. Augustine's crede ut intelligas no more means "believe to be certain'' than it means "believe to have an intellection"; it means "believe that you may understand " When the Vatican Council affirms that reason illumined by faith and inquiring pie, seduto, sobrie, can attain some limited but most fruitful intelligentia of the mysteries of faith, intelligentia means not certitude, for by faith one already is certain, nor demonstration, for the mysteries cannot be demonstrated, nor intellection, for a mystery is not a universal, but rather obviously understanding.
Nor was understanding as the ideal of scientific theology unknown to Aquinas whose principles, method, and doctrine the Church bids us follow. To ask quid sit is to ask: Why? To know quid sit is to know the cause-above all, the formal cause in the only manner that causes are known, by understanding. Hence to ask quid sit Deus expresses a natural desire; but to know quid sit Deus defines a supernatural end. For knowing quid sit Deus is understanding God. That understanding cannot result from any finite species but only inasmuch as God himself slips into and mysteriously actuates a finite intellect. But potency that no creature can actuate is obediential and its act, by definition, is supernatural. Short of this supernatural vision of God, we can know quid sit Deus only by analogy. But such analogical knowing moves on two levels. By the natural light of reason we argue from pure perfections to the pure act. In the subalternated science of theology we operate in virtue of ipsum intelligere, under the direction of divine revelation, without grasping the divine essence, yet truly understanding the relations of properties flowing from the essence, both from the connection between the mysteries and from the analogy of nature. Thus, the ideal of theology as science is the subalternated and so limited, analogical and so imperfect understanding of quid sit Deus which, though incomparable with the vision of God, far surpasses what can be grasped by the unaided light of natural reason.
By the measure of the intellectualist concept of theology, the via doctrinae of the Summa is a masterpiece. It knows just what the human mind can attain and it attains it. It does not attempt to discover a synthetic principle whence all else follows. It knows that that principle is the divine essence and that, in this life, we cannot properly know it. On the other hand, it does not renounce all thought of synthesis to settle down to teaching catechism; for it knows that there is such a thing as imperfect understanding. Systematically it proceeds to that limited goal. It begins where natural theology leaves off. It employs the Augustinian psychological analogy as the natural theologian employs his pure perfections. It develops the key concepts of procession, relation, person. Then it shifts to a higher level, consciously confronts mystery as mystery, and so transposes relations to properties and processions to notional acts. The accurate grasp of the end guarantees the perfection of the method. The perfection of the method automatically assigns the imago Dei its proper function and limited significance and no less provides the solution to the crux trinitatis. Imperfectly we grasp why God is Father, Word, and Spirit inasmuch as we conceive God, not simply as identity of being, understanding, thought, and love, but as that identity and yet with thought, because of understanding, and love, because of both, where "because" means not the logical relation between propositions but the real processio intelligibilis of an intellectual substance. What is truly profound is also very simple.
Yet into the simplicity of the via doctrinae in the Summa was poured the sum of previous trinitarian and philosophic achievement. Dogmatic development was from the apostolic symbol which briefly acknowl-edged God, the Father Almighty, Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord, and the Holy Ghost. Nicaea affirmed the Son to be truly God, consubstantial with the Father. Constantinople affirmed the divinity of the Holy Ghost. Speculative thought, on the other hand, was clearly present as via inventionis in St. Athanasius' deduction that immaterial generation must terminate in a consubstantial being; in the doctrine that distinction between the persons rests on relations as worked out by the Cappadocians, 131 and by St. Augustine; 132 in the elaboration of the notions of person and nature summarized for the East by St. John Damascene, 133 and for the West in the influential, if not altogether fortunate, work of Boethius; 134 and, finally, in the threefold problem of person, nature, and relation that came to a head in Gilbert de la Porree. 135 But more was needed to make Aquinas' viadoctrinae possible. Augustine had to transfer the name, God, from a proper name of the Father to a common name of the three persons and he had to explore the possibilities of the psychological analogy. The systematic distinction between natural and supernatural and so between philosophy and theology had to be developed. 136 Philosophy had to be cultivated to work out our natural knowledge of God and to place a scientific psychology at the disposal of theology's imago Dei. Theology had to discover its potentialities and its limitations as subalternated science. The last two of these requirements had to be met mainly by Aquinas himself. In Boetium de Trinitate, not so strangely perhaps, says nothing of the Trinity; it studies the nature of knowledge, science, faith, philosophy, theology. The De Ventate was still engaged in the translator's task of assigning Aristotelian equivalents to Augustine's memoria, intelligentia, amor.
nl Still, it offered assured promise of Aquinas' own triad of principium verbi, verbum, and amor, lu since at least implicitly it formulated the essentials of Thomist analysis of inner word as definition or judgment expressing understanding. 189 It remains that the Contra Gentiles worked out the significance of rational reflection as in the limit involving coincidence of principle and term; 140 and that the De Potentia, despite its Richardian elements, 141 not only provided the polished categorization of the factors in intellectual process, 142 but also, by treating the relations before treating the persons, 143 contained some dim anticipation of the master stroke of the Summa. Still it is only the Summa with its modest appendage, the Compendium theologiae, beginning not from the Father but from God, that abandons the Neoplatonist self-diffusion of the good as explanatory principle; that not merely employs Augustinian analogy to advance from the concept of God as ipsum intelligere to the concept of God as the absolute thinking of absolute thought; but also does so in full accord with a concept of theology in which the Aristotelian notion of science is expanded to make room for the Augustinian Crede ut intelligas.
Epilogue
From different quarters and in different manners I have been asked to explain my purpose and my method. 144 My purpose has been the Leonine purpose, Vetera novis augere et perficere, though with this modality that I believed the basic task still to be the determination of what the veter a really were. More specifically, my purpose has been to understand what Aquinas meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word. Naturally enough, my method had to be both consonant with my purpose and coherent with my conclusions. Now to understand what Aquinas meant and to understand as Aquinas understood, are one and the same thing; for acts of meaning are inner words, and inner words proceed intelligibly from acts of understanding. Further, the acts of understanding in turn result from empirical data illuminated by agent intellect; and the relevant data for the meaning of Aquinas are the written words of Aquinas. Inasmuch as one may suppose that one already possesses a habitual understanding similar to that of Aquinas, no method or effort is needed to understand as Aquinas understood; one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning will follow. But one may not be ready to make that assumption on one's own behalf. Then one has to learn. Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labor of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts, can one hope to attain such a development of one's own understanding as to hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant. Such is the method I have employed and it has been on the chance that others also might wish to employ it that these articles have been written.
The significance of this method is that it unites the ideals of the oldstyle manual written ad mentem Divi Thomae and, on the other hand, the ideal of contemporary historical study. To understand the text, to understand the meaning of the text, to understand the meaning of Aquinas, and to understand as Aquinas understood, are but a series of different specifications of the same act. However, one cannot unite apparently opposed ideals without eliminating their really opposed defects. Method is a means to an end; it sets forth two sets of rulesrules that facilitate collaboration and continuity of effort, and rules that guide the effort itself. The latter aim at understanding, but, since we cannot understand at will, they amount to rules for using chance to defeat mere chance. Still if method is essential for the development of understanding, it is no less true that method is a mere superstition when the aim of understanding is excluded. Such exclusion is the his-torian's temptation to positivièm. On the other hand, the temptation of the manual writer is to yield to the conceptualist illusion; to think that to interpret Aquinas he has merely to quote and then argue; to forget that there does exist an initial and enormous problem of developing one's understanding; to overlook the fact that, if he is content with the understanding he has and the concepts it utters, then all he can do is express his own incomprehension in the words but without the meaning uttered by the understanding of Aquinas.
A method tinged with positivism would not undertake, a method affected by conceptualist illusion could not conceive, the task of developing one's own understanding so as to understand Aquinas' comprehension of understanding and of its intelligibly proceeding inner word. Since that statement of my objective is so impressive as to be misleading, I had best add at once how little I have attempted to do. Aquinas held that only rational creatures offer an analogy to the trinitarian processions. Clearly, then, the analogy lay in their rationality. At once it followed that a purely metaphysical scheme, such as the subtleties concerning operatio and operatum, could not be relevant to trinitarian theory; for any such scheme can be applied no less to imagination than conception, no less to sensitive desire than to rational love. Again, it followed at once that no conceptualist theory of human intellect could meet the case; for conceptualism consists precisely in the affirmation that concepts proceed not from intellectual knowledge and so intelligibly but, on the contrary, with the same natural spontaneity as images from imagination. I had, then, before me the negative task of detaching from Thomist interpretation the endless tendrils of an ivy mantle woven by over-subtle metaphysicians and conceptualist gnoseologists. This I undertook in positive fashion by writing a series of lexicographical notes on Thomist usage; their purpose was to preclude the misapprehensions on which misinterpretation thrives. By doing my negative work in positive fashion, I simultaneously furthered my own positive end, namely, to show that Aquinas adverted to the act of understanding and made it central in his rational psychology.
This positive task had been anticipated. In his famous L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas, Pierre Rousselot maintained what was very obvious, however much overlooked, that in the writings of Aquinas it was not the rarely treated concept but the perpetually recurring in-tellect that was central and basic. If Rousselot was content with a metaphysical intellectualism, others were not. Péghaire's Intellectus et ratio showed that understanding was both the principle and the term of all discursive thought, and, on the other hand, Hoenen's articles in Gregorianum brought to light both the necessity of some intellectual apprehension of nexus in phantasm and, as well, the recognition of this fact by Aristotle and by Aquinas.
All that was needed was to put together what had lain apart, and it could not but come together easily. Aquinas' master, St. Albert the Great, had no illusions about the basic nature of intellect. In that respect he divided men into three classes-those who had no need of teachers, those helped by teachers, and those who could not be helped. For such helplessness two causes were assigned-natural defect and bad habit. Among such bad habits was counted a prolonged study of laws without any inquiry into causes or reasons, so that a man became quite incapable of philosophy. 145 Plainly, Albert's view of intellect included understanding. Now Aquinas would not miss that point. In fact, when he was out to crush Averroism, he appealed to his stock argument: "Hie homo intelligit.
,> He might have appealed to conceptual knowledge of universals; but it was so much more effective to appeal to the act of understanding: "Si enim hoc negetur, tunc dicens hanc opinionem non intelligit aliquid, et ideo non est audiendus." 146 It was a peremptory argument. It still is; for if men will doubt or deny that they have universal concepts, who will lay it down as evident that he understands nothing? Nor was Aquinas content to appeal to the intimate fact that we do understand; he made that fact the key to knowledge of the human soul: "Dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam."
147 But if understanding is the proper act of the human soul, much more so is it the proper act of the angels who "nee habent aliam operationem vitae nisi intelligere." 148 Finally, it takes no great acumen to see that the very Platonist formula, ipsum intelligere, has no more a Platonist meaning than ipsum esse. As Aquinas did not conceive God as the subsistent Idea of being, so he did not conceive divine knowledge as the knowledge-beyond-knowledge attributed by Plotinus to the One and by the pseudo-Dionysius to God. It is not merely that Dionysian language was to hand and he did not use it, while Aristotelian arguments were unfamiliar, yet he used them. It is that all he has to say about knowledge is based on the Aristotelian principle of identity; that he rejected the Platonist assumption that knowledge is by confrontation; that it is only that assumption which forces Platonists into the profundity beyond profundity of positing knowledge beyond knowledge to reach a meaning beyond meaning that certainly is mystifying and, at least for Aristotelians, likewise meaningless. We can conceive pure perfection without limitation; but once limits are denied, we have reached our limit and cannot go beyond the unlimited. Least of all could Aquinas have lost himself in the Platonist fog and at the same time steadily progressed from the Sentences towards the clear and calm, the economic and functional, the balanced and exact series of questions and articles of the via doctrinae in the Summa, in which the intellectualism of Aristotle, made over into the intellectualism of St. Thomas, shines as unmistakably as the sun on the noonday summer hills of Italy.
It seems to me that intellectualism, if once it gains a foothold, never will be dislodged from the interpretation of Thomist trinitarian theory. If that is correct, I have reached my objective. Also, of course, if it is correct, many other things follow. To clarify the purpose of these articles, I hasten to add that I have not been concerned with them. From the viewpoint of history there are many questions beyond the bald fact that Aquinas adverted to understanding and made it central in his psychology. But these questions are further questions. They presuppose the bald fact and ask about its measure and degree, its emergence and development, its reinforcement and weakening from combination and conflict with other influences in Thomist sources and the medieval milieu. From the writings of Aquinas one can extend inquiry to other writers, prior, contemporary, subsequent, eventually to invite some historian of the stature of M. Gilson to describe the historical experiment of understanding understanding and thinking thought. My aim has not been to treat such further questions but to raise the issue of such treatment by settling a preliminary fact and indicating elementary landmarks.
Perhaps, however, I may express my conviction that many of the points studied in these articles are very relevant to the history of the Aristotelian-Augustinian conflict. But, over and above the historical, there is also a series of theoretical further questions. It was, I think, very important for me not to touch them, not merely because their expansion in all directions takes place with the immediacy of logical implication, but still more because the theoretical exposition of Thomist thought has already had its definitive edition from the hands of St. Thomas himself. To put the same point in a slightly different manner, one may distinguish two developments of understanding. There is the development that aims at grasping what Pope Leo's Vetera really were; there is the development that aims at effecting his Vetera novis augere et perficere. To fail to distinguish between these two aims even materially, as in the inclusion of both within the covers of the same book, results not in economy but in confusion. The immediacy of logical implication has no respect for differences of place and time and no power of discrimination between different stages of development of an essentially identical philosophic or theological tradition. One can aim at understanding Aquinas; one can aim at a transposition of his position to meet the issues of our own day; but to aim at both simultaneously results inevitably, I believe, in substituting for the real Aquinas some abstract ideal of theoretical coherence that might, indeed, be named the Platonic idea of Aquinas, were it not for the fact that a Platonic idea is one, while such ideals of logical coherence happen to be disquietingly numerous. Plainly, there was only one real Aquinas; plainly, there can be many Thomistic developments. And though they are many, still there never will be any difficulty in distinguishing the genuine from the counterfeit. "Ex operibus eorum cognoscetis eos." A completely genuine development of the thought of St. Thomas will command in all the universities of the modern world the same admiration and respect that St. Thomas himself commanded in the medieval University of Paris. If the labors of Catholic scholars during the past seventy years have been great and their fruits already palpable, it remains that so sanguine an expectation has not yet been brought to birth. For that reason my purpose has been limited to determining on a restricted but, I believe, significant point what the Vetera really were.
